From hungary-online-owner Sat Dec 2 19:31:41 1995 Received: from localhost (daemon@localhost) (fnord) by nando.yak.net (8.6.5/8.6.5) id TAA29828 for hungary-online-out31415; Sat, 2 Dec 1995 19:31:41 -0800 Received: from localhost (daemon@localhost) (fnord) by nando.yak.net (8.6.5/8.6.5) id TAA29819; Sat, 2 Dec 1995 19:31:29 -0800 Received: from ddt@lsd.com () via =-=-=-=-=-= for hungary-online@hungary.yak.net (29817) Received: from gwarn.versant.com (gwarn.versant.com [192.70.173.14]) (fnord) by nando (8.6.5/8.6.5) with ESMTP id TAA29814 for ; Sat, 2 Dec 1995 19:31:20 -0800 Received: from netcom13.netcom.com (root@netcom13.netcom.com [192.100.81.125]) by gwarn.versant.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id TAA24253 for ; Sat, 2 Dec 1995 19:29:58 -0800 Received: from [129.46.82.85] by netcom13.netcom.com (8.6.12/Netcom) id TAA06732; Sat, 2 Dec 1995 19:25:57 -0800 Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Sender: Level Seven Design X-PGP-KeyID-Fprnt: 4AAF00E5 - 30D81F3484E6A83F 6EC8D7F0CAB3D265 X-PGP: http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/htbin/pks-extract-key.pl?op=get&search=lsd X-Floppyright: (f)1995 LSD.com _ Unlicensed retransmission prohibited. Date: Sat, 2 Dec 1995 19:28:35 -0800 To: hungary-online@hungary.yak.net From: Dave Del Torto Subject: (HOL) [FWD] The Next Enemy Sender: owner-Hungary-Online@hungary.yak.net Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Hungary-Online@hungary.yak.net /* URL: */ Forum, Number 35, July 1995 THE NEXT ENEMY Martin C. Libicki, National Defense University [Excerpts] The Cold War offered military planners considerable strategic clarity the threat was known, and the problem was generating a force structure of sufficient size and sophistication to counter it. Today's military threats are varied and, for the most part, well below the level that even a shrinking U.S. force can handle comfortably. Threats ten to twenty years out, however, must be taken seriously because of the long time required to complete a major systems acquisition; to develop, test, and institutionalize new doctrine; and to accomplish the organizational innovations necessary to use both effectively. Future threats may be divided into four categories: peers, bullies, terrorism, and chaos. ... Peers Few planners think it likely that the next twenty years will see a reemergence of a nation that can pose a challenge to U.S. military power as broadly as the Soviet Union did. However, at least two countries (Russia and China) could conceivably be peer adversaries at the strategic level of nuclear weapons, space, and information systems. ... Another avenue of future competition may be information warfare. Can or should the United States hold other nations' participation in the world economy at risk? The United States might be able to shut down another nation's banking system but not without risk of collateral damage to the global banking system. Can physical war be replaced by a survival contest among rival information systems under attack? Perhaps the United States should concentrate on developing defensive systems. The United States has the biggest stones, but also the most glass in its house. ... A world of peer strategic competition would drive the military in familiar directions towards: nuclear forces, satellites and other long-range warning systems; tactical ballistic missile defense systems (including for allies); perhaps strategic defense systems and space attack systems; air defense in general; information warfare and security; and robust command-and-control. Bullies If the circumstances and logic of the Bottom Up Review hold true for two more decades, U.S. armed forces will be sized and structured primarily to engage in two simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs). The usual suspects in such MRCs (e.g., Iran, Iraq, North Korea) are presently unsophisticated rogue states that aspire to nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Conference participants believe that U.S. forces could cope with the challenges of future conventional warfare, even if force levels continue to diminish. However, two events would make the United States rethink its strategy nuclear weapons proliferation, and the sophisticated exploitation of world technology markets. ... Alternatively, an MRC opponent may be able to avoid going to the nuclear threshold by a strategy which uses smart munitions, commercial command-and-control, and a variety of surveillance technologies (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles, third-party satellite surveillance) to exact damaging casualties on U.S. forces. ... Against a sophisticated regional foe, the United States might not want to use platforms at all but rely on a combination of stand-off attack forces, and information-based warfare assets (for giving targeting data to local coalition partners), coupled with special operations forces used for liaison and other tasks. Terrorism Largely because of the limited capability that classical military instruments have in coping with terrorism, conference participants kept returning to the threat that it may pose to U.S. national security. Incidents may range from the use of conventional explosives (e.g., what if the van in the World Trade Center explosion had been parked in a more vulnerable spot), to nuclear or chemical weapons, biological agents, and their analogue in cyberspace information warfare. Devices that can cause terror are getting easier to manufacture and transport and harder to detect. The equipment for replicating biological agents is inexpensive; the equipment for replicating computer agents is even cheaper. Many otherwise third-world Asian nations have very large computer-literate cohorts that make them potential information warfare powers. ... Chaos Over the next two decades, states will continue to fail. Some failures may create circumstances (e.g., refugees, malcontents, and environmental damage) which topple other states. To cope, the United States may need a robust capability to conduct peace and relief operations. ... A concentration on peace operations may also be a good reason to expand foreign military interactions. Improving interoperability with future coalition partners carries many advantages. Yet, above a certain technological level of integration, the risk of exposing information on U.S. capabilities to what may be temporary allies has to be carefully managed. If countering chaos were the primary mission of the U.S. armed forces, then they would have to become lighter and more mobile (because states often fail with little warning, and the United States usually responds only in extremis). The Army and Marine Corps would have larger roles, while the Navy and Air Force would focus on lift. As emergency operations become the norm, some functions assigned to reserve units may have to be shifted to active ones (e.g., to allow civil affairs assets to be used more frequently). ############# # This message to Hungary-Online@hungary.yak.net # was from Dave Del Torto # # To unsubscribe, # send "unsubscribe" to # An announcement-only subscription (less volume) is available # at # Send mail to for more information, # or to if you need human assistance. #############